Threat model

What Kryfo protects you from, and what it doesn't.

If getting this wrong could put you in danger, read all of it.

The short version

Kryfo hides what you say from the network, the relays and us. On Private, the default, it also hides where you connect from and who you are. It cannot protect a phone someone else controls, and it has not been audited yet.

What it protects against

What it does not protect against

A quick look, not a lab

The decoy PIN and hidden chats are for someone scrolling through your unlocked phone, not for a forensic copy. A copy can show that Kryfo holds more than it shows, and a short PIN can be guessed against it. Up to 0.5.3 Kryfo does not encrypt photos, voice notes and files on the phone, hidden chats included. From 0.6 it does, and hidden chats' files open only with their PIN once it is used after the update. Android's storage and battery figures for the app are not hidden.

Against a forensic copy, use the wipe PIN, or better, don't keep the data on the phone.

Someone who knows your three words or handle sees different ones in the decoy, and nothing arriving for you shows while it is open. A backup made in hidden chats carries them, and its size can give that away.

For now the decoy is never online: nothing sent to or from it arrives. In 0.7 it goes online while open, on its own Tor connection.

The law

In some countries refusing to unlock a phone, or hiding data from officials, is an offence. The decoy never invents conversations, since fake messages can make things worse. Know the law where you live and travel.

Writing to the developer anonymously

It hides your three words, not your writing style or what you say. On Fast our relays see the address you connect from.

Found a problem?

Please tell us privately first. The security page (in English) says how, and what happens next.