Kryfo hides what you say from the network, the relays and us. On Private, the default, it also hides where you connect from and who you are. It cannot protect a phone someone else controls, and it has not been audited yet.
What it protects against
- The network. On Private, the default, Kryfo goes through Tor, with a bridge if Tor is blocked. Fast skips Tor for messages, so our two relays see your address. Pair codes, burner rooms and first contacts go through Tor on both. On every route your internet provider sees encrypted traffic, not who you talk to or what you say.
- The relays. Messages are sealed twice and sent from a throwaway key to a mailbox that belongs to one conversation, not to anyone's identity. No relay can read them. On Private, relays never learn your IP address or who you are. On Fast our two relays see your IP address, never what you say. Public relays are only ever reached through Tor.
- Seizing our servers. There is no central store of messages, contact lists or accounts to take.
- Your phone number. Kryfo never asks for one, and no address book is uploaded.
- Someone making you unlock the app. A decoy PIN opens an empty Kryfo. Hidden chats open only with their own PIN and leave no trace while shut. A wipe PIN removes Kryfo from the phone.
- Someone posing as the developer. The key behind the chat with Marios is built into the app, and every message there is checked against it.
What it does not protect against
- A phone someone else controls. Malware, or someone holding your unlocked phone, sees what you see. No messenger can fix that.
- The engine folder on Windows. While Kryfo runs, and after a crash until the next start, it sits unencrypted on disk with the onion key and some relay state. A coming update seals it.
- The people you talk to. They can screenshot, copy or forward what you send, or tell others that you talk.
- Someone watching most of the internet. Tor makes linking traffic expensive, not impossible, and Kryfo sends no cover traffic.
- The fact that you talked. Kryfo keeps metadata minimal but can't erase it. If you send while a contact is online, that timing exists.
- Mistakes in Kryfo itself. The encryption is standard, but how Kryfo combines it has not had an outside audit yet.
A quick look, not a lab
The decoy PIN and hidden chats are for someone scrolling through your unlocked phone, not for a forensic copy. A copy can show that Kryfo holds more than it shows, and a short PIN can be guessed against it. Up to 0.5.3 Kryfo does not encrypt photos, voice notes and files on the phone, hidden chats included. From 0.6 it does, and hidden chats' files open only with their PIN once it is used after the update. Android's storage and battery figures for the app are not hidden.
Against a forensic copy, use the wipe PIN, or better, don't keep the data on the phone.
Someone who knows your three words or handle sees different ones in the decoy, and nothing arriving for you shows while it is open. A backup made in hidden chats carries them, and its size can give that away.
For now the decoy is never online: nothing sent to or from it arrives. In 0.7 it goes online while open, on its own Tor connection.
The law
In some countries refusing to unlock a phone, or hiding data from officials, is an offence. The decoy never invents conversations, since fake messages can make things worse. Know the law where you live and travel.
Writing to the developer anonymously
It hides your three words, not your writing style or what you say. On Fast our relays see the address you connect from.
Found a problem?
Please tell us privately first. The security page (in English) says how, and what happens next.